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JUDGES AS ALTRUISTIC HIERARCHS
2001 George C. Wythe Lecture
LYNN A. STOUT*
Judges are hierarchs. By this, I mean that judges in our society
enjoy positions of unusual authority associated with four important
characteristics. First, judges possess remarkable power to decide
the fates and fortunes of others. Second, they possess this power not
because they have purchased it in the market or acquired it by
force, but because they have been selected to receive it, sometimes
by the very persons whose fates and fortunes they will decide.'
Third, judges are expected to use their power not to pursue their
own interests-which would be viewed as an abuse of power-but
to serve the social goal of the fair and impartial application of law.2
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles Law School. Much of the
work on this Article was completed while I was Professor of Law and Director of the Sloan
Project on Business Institutions at the Georgetown University Law Center, and I would like
to thank both the Sloan Foundation and the Law Center for their support. I am also
indebted to Judy Areen, Jayne Barnard, Margaret Blair, Lan Cao, Julie Cohen, Michael
Diamond, Robert Drinan, the Honorable Harry T. Edwards, Mitu Gulati, Vicki Jackson,
Neal Katyal, Daniel Klerman, David Luban, Alan Meese, Wendy Perdue, the Honorable
Richard A. Posner, Kevin Quinn, Eric Rasmusen, Frederick Schauer, Mike Seidman, the
Honorable Leo Strine, Mark Tushnet, and Robin West for their useful comments and
insights; my apologies to anyone whose name I may have inadvertently omitted.
1. Consider the recent case of Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), in which a Supreme
Court whose members had been selected by past presidents determined which of two
competing candidates would become the next president. Similarly, state court judges are
often elected and re-elected to office by the citizenry to decide disputes between, inter alia,
state citizens. RobertD. Cooter, The Objectives ofPrivate and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE
107, 128 (1983) (describing election of judges in California).
2. There is room for substantial disagreement about what it means to say that judges
ought to "apply the law." Perhaps judges should focus solely on the text of the law, or on the
original intent of those who drafted it, or on some broader notion of the public good. The
point is that, whatever one's view about where one finds the law, it is generally understood
that the judge's role is to figure out what the law is and to apply it fairly, impartially, and
carefully to the case at hand. Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories for
Judicial Election, Selection, andAccountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1617,1640-41 (1988) ("All
theoretical attempts at answering the question how judges should decide cases agree that
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(One can of course argue over where judges should look to find the
law-indeed, this is a central problem in jurisprudence-but what-
ever "the law" is, it is commonly understood that it is normatively
desirable that judges follow it). Fourth, judges are expected to serve
this social goal faithfully, even though they have remarkably little
financial incentive to do so.
The federal judiciary offers a striking example of this pattern.
At both the trial and the appellate levels, federal judges enjoy
enormous discretion to determine the outcomes of the cases before
them.' They enjoy this authority because they have been appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.4 They
are expected to use their judicial powers to decide disputes fairly
and according to law, even though they receive no significant
external rewards when they do so, and suffer no significant external
punishments when they do not.
It is this last aspect of judges' hierarchical status that I find
especially intriguing and troubling, and it is the focus of this
discussion. Consider the monetary incentives faced by the typical
member of the federal judiciary. A federal judge has a job for life,
and she cannot be removed from it unless she indulges in the
most egregious forms of conduct.5 As a matter of law, her salary
is fixed by Act of Congress; it can neither be increased to reward
superlative effort, nor cut to punish inferior performance.' As a
result, federal judges operate in a world where monetary carrots
and sticks are notably lacking. Indeed, if one looks only at financial
incentives, it is difficult to explain why most federal judges do not
simply decide their cases by flipping a coin, and then take the rest
of the day off and go fishing.7
it is a prime duty for ajudge to obey the law, and to develop it within the constraints imposed
by the legal system and its tradition.").
3. Because bringing an appeal is both expensive and uncertain, a federal district court's
ruling often determines the outcome of a case. At the circuit court level, an opinion can only
be overturned by the Supreme Court.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("Judges... shallhold their offices during good behavior....").
6. Id. ("Judges... shall... receive for their services, a compensation, which 'shall not
be diminished during the continuance in office.").
7. The judicial role is not the only hierarchal role we observe in contemporary society.
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Contemporary scholars, faced with this lacuna, have had to
employ a great deal of imagination to explain why judges might
in fact perceive it as in their self-interest to do a good job of
judging.' For example, in one early and pioneering article on the
subject, Robert Cooter argued that judges are motivated by the
desire to enhance their prestige among lawyers and litigants.9
Other commentators have hypothesized that judges might expend
effort because they hope to be appointed to a higher court, fear
being reversed by a higher court, are concerned about their
reputations among their fellow judges, or have a general desire to
exercise influence ° and "have an impact for the sake of having an
Trustees, guardians, and directors ofnonprofit corporations are also selected to receive power
that they are then expected to exercise for the benefit of others, in circumstances where there
are few external incentives for them to do a good job. To some extent this is also true of the
directors of many for-profit corporations. As a legal matter, directors of public corporations
control corporate assets worth trillions ofdollars. Although they are expected to exercise this
control for the benefit of the firm and its shareholders, there are remarkably few external
incentives to motivate them to do a good job. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 315-19 (1999) (discussing directors
as altruistic hierarchs); Lynn A. Stout, In Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral
Defense of Van Gorkum and the Business Judgment Rule, 96 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (same). I suspect that many tenured law professors may also view themselves as
altruistic hierarchs.
8. See Cooter, supra note 1, at 107 ("[Elconomists have nothadmuch success in creating
a theory to explain the objectives of public judges."); David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and
the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal Scholarship, 50 VAND. L. REV. 647, 653 n.19
(1997) (book review) ("[Plublic choice theorists have had far more difficulty modeling ...
judges' behavior, as compared to legislators and private economic actors, due to the absence
of a compelling theory as to what.., judges maximize.").
9. Cooter, supra note 1, at 129.
10. E.g., Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 85-86 (1991) (noting that within the paradigm of public choice
theory, "consistency requires ascribing some sort of self-centered motivation to judges," such
as the desire to exercise power, to increase their salaries by pleasing the legislature, or to
garner the approval of lawyers and legal academics); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and
External Costs and Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 93, 110-11 (1989)
(suggesting that judges are motivated by the desire for leisure, the fear of reversal, and the
wish to enhance the power of the judiciary); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices
Maximize? (The Same ThingEverybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1,13-15,31 (1994)
(suggesting that judges are self-interested and act to maximize their leisure, influence,
prestige, reputation, and enjoyment); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling (In)dependence of
Courts;A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721 (1994) (suggesting that desires for
favorable postings might influence Japanese judges' decisions); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny
and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect
Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787,1823-24 (1992) (arguing that judges might use their power
to pursue their private interests but might nevertheless choose rules that maximize average
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impact."" Judge (formerly Professor) Richard Posner has argued
that, in addition to these concerns, judges may also get utility from
playing the judicial "game" according to its rules. Posner posits that
judges may decline to decide cases on personal whim for the "same
reason that many people do not cheat at games even when they are
sure they can get away with cheating. The pleasure of judging is
bound up with compliance with certain self-limiting rules that
define the 'game' of judging."2
In this discussion, I suggest an alternative approach. In offering
this alternative, I do not intend to suggest that the quest for
prestige, the fear of reversal, the hope of higher appointment, or
concern for one's reputation are unimportant judicial incentives.
Rather, I suggest that they are incomplete. I believe that if we wish
to truly understand hierarchy in general and the judiciary in
particular, we must formally acknowledge a fundamental truth
about judges that is implicit in many popular discussions of the
judiciary, 3 but notably absent from much contemporary scholarly
social welfare, assuming that the rules will also enhance their welfare); Stephen M.
Bainbridge & Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Way Everybody Else
Does-Bowdedly) Rules of Thumb in Security Fraud Opinions (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that self-interested judges seeking to reduce their
dockets and to avoid cases they find personally uninteresting adopt doctrinal"shortcuts" that
allow them to refuse to hear many securities fraud class actions); Eric Rasmussen,A Theory
of Trustees, and Other Thoughts, with apostscript 7-8 (2000) (arguing that judges are a form
of trustee and that they are motivated by pride and by the desire to keep their positions,
exercise power, and impose theirfavoredpolicies), available at http/pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/
erasmuse/ published/98.BOOItrustees.NEW.pdf.
11. Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 615, 627-34 (2000) (Robert S. Marx Lecture).
12. Posner, supra note 10, at 28. This argument raises the interesting question of why
a judge might value "following the rules" more than following her personal preferences for
a particular outcome. Although Posner posits that following the rules gives judges pleasure,
this is not inconsistent with the claim that following the rules remains a form of other-
regarding behavior. See infra text accompanying notes 15-16 (discussing revealed preference
approach to altruism).
13. Posner, supra note 10, at 25-26 (noting "the piety in which the public discussion ofjudges is usually clothed"); Schauer, supra note 11, at 624 (noting that "ij]udges occupy ...
a romantic position in much of American consciousness," and that there is "an image of thejudge as someone largely lacking in self-interest"). This view also is prevalent among many
law students and professors. The image of the judge as a benevolent and dedicated lawgiver,
however, tends to be something that is both "in the air" at law schools, and remarkably
absent from formal scholarly discussions ofjudicial motivation. See infra note 14 (discussing
literature on judicial motivation).
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discourse on judicial motivation and behavior. 4 This fundamental
truth is that the modern judiciary rests on the expectation that
judges will behave in an altruistic fashion.
ALTRUISM AND RATIONAL CHOICE
To some, the word "altruistic" may conjure up images of Mother
Theresa and similar ascetics who devote their lives to helping
others. I do not intend to suggest that we expect judges to endure
similar levels of self-sacrifice. Nor do I suggest that judicial
altruism need be directed toward any particular person or persons.
I am saying something far more modest. I am saying that we expect
judges to try to do the right thing-to try to apply the rules of law in
a fair, impartial, and consistent manner-even though they are
neither rewarded when they do, nor punished when they do not. 5
14. Much of contemporary legal literature rejects, implicitly or explicitly, the notion that
as a positive matter judges might try "to do the right thing" even when they would prefer to
not do so. See sources cited supra notes 9-11; see also sources cited infra note 18 (discussing
related views of critical legal theorists who argue that judges self-interestedly use their
power to impose their personal policy preferences on the broader society).
An exception to this rule can be found in a series of articles authored by the Honorable
Harry T. Edwards, himself ajudge, which argue thatjudicial decisions ought to be, and often
are, the product of the neutral application of law rather than a judge's desire to advance his
own political views or otherwise indulge in self-interest. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and
Decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. Rv. 1335 (1998); Harry T. Edwards, The
Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WISC. L. REV.
837; Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current
Practice in FederalAppellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1984); see also Ronald
A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-Making, 75 B.U. L. REV.
941, 995 (1995) (arguing that judges have incentive to "adhere to professional norms, " for
both internal and external reasons); supra note 12 (discussing Richard Posner's theory that
judges enjoy following the rules of the "game" of judging).
Interestingly, while most modern legal scholars reject the positive claim that judges are
drivenby something other than self-interest,jurisprudential discussions generallybeginwith
this as the normative ideal. E.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEpI OF LAW 115 (2d ed. 1994)
(arguing that in applying the law a judge must think that "what he does is the right thing");
Gavison, supra note 2, at 1640 ("All... agree that it is a prime duty for a judge to obey the
law....").
15. Although there is ample room for disagreement about where judges ought to look to
find "the law," see supra note 2, there is a general consensus that the requisites for good
judging include competence at identifying law, commitment to obeying it, and impartiality
in applyingit. Gavison, supra note 2, at 1623-24, 1628 (legal competence, impartiality, and
obedience to law lie at "the relatively unproblematic core of the judicial role").
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To put the point (somewhat awkwardly) in economic terms, I am
arguing that we expect judges to display what I shall call "other-
regarding revealed preferences." I employ the economic concept of
a revealed preference here to emphasize that I am discussing how
judges behave rather than how they feel. Judges' apparently
altruistic behavior may be driven by guilt, ego, mindless adherence
to role, or the fear that a goddess in a toga will strike the erring
judge with lightning. Whatever the motivational source of other-
regarding behavior, the bottom line is that judges often act as if
they care not just about costs and benefits to themselves but also
about costs and benefits to others, including perhaps such abstract
"others" as the rule of law, or ideals of proper judicial conduct. 6
This is a far more diluted version of altruism than the sort
associated with Mother Theresa. Indeed, it might be alternatively
described as moral principle, commitment to public service, legal
craftsmanship, or even noblesse oblige. Yet even so diluted, the
notion that altruism plays a role in shaping judicial behavior is
controversial. This is because the idea of altruism flies in the face
of rational choice analysis, which generally presumes that the best
way to model and predict human behavior is to assume that people
are rational actors concerned only with improving their own
welfare. 17
Rational choice theory has become a staple of modern legal
scholarship, and this is no less true for scholars who study the
judiciary than for those who study contract law or products liability.
As a result, the homo economicus model of behavior provides the
foundation on which much of the contemporary scholarly literature
on judicial behavior is built. 8 This influence is especially apparent
16. In effect, I am adopting a behavioral approach that treats the judge as a black box.
Rather than trying to observe what goes on inside the box, I simply compare the social and
economic variables that go into the box and the behavior that comes out.
17. It is something of a standard move for rational choice theorists to suggest that if
people behave altruistically this must mean that they get pleasure (utility) from helping
others, so altruism remains consistent with self-interest. This move has a tautological flavor:
it presumes that people are selfish and so anything they do, they must do to make
themselves better off. Moreover, as a practical matter most rational choice analysis of the
judiciary rests implicitly on the assumption that judges and other people look out only for
their own interests, narrowly defined. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 9-11.
18. See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 1, Elhauge, supra note 10, Macey, supra note 10, Posner,
supra note 10, Schauer, supra note 11, Stout, supra note 10. But see Chris Guthrie et al.,
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in the writings of those who work in the area known as "public
choice," a field which applies the tools of economics to the behavior
of political actors, and presumes that legislators, judges, and other
public servants are motivated primarily by self-interest. 9
I believe that rational choice theory has much to offer in our
quest to explain the actions of government institutions. I also
believe, however, that rational choice can be fundamentally mis-
leading when used to analyze a hierarchical role like that of the
modern judge. Standard rational choice analysis leaves out
something important, something that lies at the core of our notions
of proper judging. The missing ingredient is altruism. I suspect that
if we really expected judges to behave purely selfishly, they would
not play nearly so great a role in our economic and political system,
nor would we grant individual judges so much power. A corollary
is that if we want to develop a solid understanding of judicial
motivation, we must formally recognize the phenomenon of other-
regarding behavior and incorporate it into the analysis of judicial
behavior.
To do this we need to look outside economics and rational choice
to the broader social sciences literature. I have reviewed some of
that literature, and I have good news to report: social scientists
outside the field of economics have developed a rather impressive
Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (reporting results of empirical study
designed to test not whether judges were self-interested, but whether they were rational).
Although the idea that judges are selfish and rational actors is associated with the "law and
economics" perspective, a related assumption ofjudicial self-interest may underlie the work
of critical legal theorists who argue that judges do not apply principles of law in a neutral
fashion, but instead use their considerable discretion to interpret those rules to impose their
own political ideologies on the broader society. E.g., DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION: FINDE SiCLE 57 (1997) (discussing Americanjudiciai's "bad faith"); LOUIS
MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OURUNSETTLED CONSTITUIMON: ANEW DEFENSE OFCONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (2001) (arguing that judges decide cases according to their political
preferences); MarkV. Tushnet, Following the RulesLaidDown:A Critique ofInterpretivism
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 821-22 (1983) (arguing that legal rules are
manipulable and that judges interpret them to justify the outcomes they want). Of course,
if a particular judge believes that her ideological principles are in fact in society's best
interest, and if she applies those principles even in cases where she finds the result
personally distasteful, one might argue that such behavior is in fact other-regarding.
19. Skeel, supra note 8, at 651. See generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW: READINGS AND COMMENTARY (1997); Symposium, Positive Political Theory and
Public Law, 80 GEO. L.J. 457 (1992); Symposium, The Theory ofPublic Choice, 74 VA. L. REV.
167 (1988).
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formal understanding of when, why, and to what extent people are
likely to behave in an other-regarding fashion.2 ° Altruism, it turns
out, is neither a rare nor a quirky behavior. Indeed, it is both
common and predictable.
As an introduction to this literature, I would like to focus on a
representative subset of the evidence on altruistic behavior that I
believe is both especially compelling and especially useful. This is
the empirical evidence from studies of human behavior in a type of
experimental game known as a "social dilemma."
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE OF ALTRUISM IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Casual empiricism suggests that everyday life is full of incidents
of altruism. People keep promises, leave tips, and decline to take
advantage of others' obvious mistakes even in nakedly commercial
transactions. Yet to the dedicated skeptic, such anecdotal evidence
may be unconvincing. This may be because contemporary societies
tend to be structured so that altruistic behavior also is at least
consistent with-if not necessarily fully explained by-observable
external incentives.2' As an example of this pattern, consider the
observation that most people do not mug other people. Altruism
offers one possible explanation for this phenomenon: perhaps most
people prefer not to hurt and frighten others. It is also possible,
however, that most people do not mug others solely out of fear that
they will be arrested and punished, or fear that their victims might
resist and injure them.22
In social dilemma experiments, social scientists can exclude the
possibility of such external motivations for altruistic behavior by
creating situations that clearly pit self-interest against the interests
20. E.g., HOWARDMARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUiSM,ANDRATIONALITY(1982); BEYOND
SELF-INTEREST (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); COOPERATION AND PROsOCIAL BEHAVIOUR
(Robert A. Hinde & Jo Groebel eds., 1991). These are only a few examples of a vast literature.
21. For a partial explanation of this pattern, see infra note 38 (discussing how legal
sanctions can support altruistic behavior by reducing its relative cost, and thus encourage
altruistic adherence to law even in situations where the threat of legal sanction alone would
not suffice to deter a purely selfish actor from violations).
22. Similarly, one person maykeep herpromise to another because she feels an altruistic
commitment to do so. She may also keep her promise, however, because she fears that if she
does not, the promisee will "tattle" on her to their mutual friends, and her reputation will
suffer.
1612 [Vol. 43:1605
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of others. This is done by asking two or more experimental
subjects to play a game in which they must each choose between
two strategies: either "cooperate," or "defect." Payoffs in the game
are structured so that each subject always maximizes her personal
return by defecting. Yet if everyone defects, the group as a whole
gets less than if all cooperated.24
As this description suggests, subjects in social dilemmas face
incentives similar to those presented by the famous "prisoner's
dilemma" of game theory. Rationally selfish subjects should always
choose to defect.' Yet homo sapiens placed in social dilemmas turn
out to behave quite differently from homo economicus. Over the
past four decades, scholars have published the results of hundreds
of experimental studies in which subjects were asked to play social
dilemmas. As a rule of thumb, experimenters have found that
cooperation rates in social dilemmas average about fifty percent.2
23. See generally Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or
My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note 20, at 97-110 (summarizing social
dilemma studies); Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Cooperation, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 187
(1988) (summarizing studies); David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social
Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & SOcOy 58
(1995) (summarizing over 100 studies done between 1958 and 1992); Toshio Yamagishi, The
Structural Goal/Expectation Theory of Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, in 3 ADVANCES IN
GROUP PROCESSES 51 (Edward J. Lawler ed., 1986) (summarizing studies).
24. A classic example of a social dilemma is the "Give Something" game. In that game,
a group ofn subjects is given an initial monetary stake-say, $10 each. The subjects are then
asked to choose between either keeping all their money for themselves or contributing all or
part to a common "investment pool." The players are told that any money contributed to the
pool will be multiplied by some factor of n-1 or less, and then redistributed to all the subjects
pro rata. Because each player is allowed to share in the pool regardless of whether she
contributes, the best individual strategy for the selfish player is to contribute nothing. The
group's total (and average) payoff, however, is only maximized if each player contributes her
entire stake.
25. In order to exclude the possibility of external incentives for cooperation, social
scientists have run social dilemma experiments involving large groups of subjects who were
told they would play the game only once and who were assured that their choice of strategy
could not be observed by either the experimenter or their fellow players. Sally, supra note
23, at 65, 67. In such situations there is no possibility that a player would suffer either
retaliation or reputational loss by choosing to defect. A purely selfish player accordingly
would always defect.
26. See supra note 23.
27. E.g., Dawes & Thaler, supra note 23, at 189 (subjects on average contribute 60 to 40
percent in social dilemma contribution games); Sally, supra note 23, at 62 (finding mean
cooperation rate of about fifty percent for sample of over 130 social dilemma studies).
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People cooperate-and they cooperate frequently. What does this
tell us?
First, that altruism exists and indeed is common. In the right
circumstances-in a moment I shall elaborate on what I mean by
"the right circumstances"-people regularly and reliably reveal
other-regarding preferences. In other words, people often act as if
they care about costs and benefits to others, and not just as if they
care about costs and benefits to themselves.
Not always, however. Social dilemma studies teach us that most
people have a remarkable capacity for altruism, but they also teach
us something else: the decision to behave altruistically appears
largely determined by what I shall call "social" variables. Such
social variables include beliefs about what others need, what
others expect, how others are likely to behave, and what others'
relationships are to oneself. Purely selfish actors would be
indifferent to such concerns unless they somehow changed their
own economic payoffs. Real people, it turns out, are exquisitely
responsive to them.
This responsiveness is obvious from the social dilemma evidence.
Although cooperation rates in social dilemma experiments average
fifty percent, experimenters have been able to produce a wide range
of cooperation rates by changing the social context in which the
game is played. Indeed, by altering social variables, experimenters
have produced cooperation rates in social dilemmas as high as
ninety-five percent (almost universal altruism) and as low as five
percent (an almost complete absence of altruism).2" It is important
to bear in mind in considering these findings that social dilemmas
are structured so that purely selfish players always defect.
Social dilemma experiments accordingly provide compelling
evidence that most people have a capacity to behave in an altruistic
fashion. But-and this is a key "but--they are only likely to behave
altruistically when the social conditions are favorable.
cooperation rate of about fifty percent for sample of over 130 social dilemma studies).
28. Sally, supra note 23, at 62, 71.
1614 [Vol. 43:1605
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SOME SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF ALTRUISM IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS
Let us examine some of the factors that have been found to be
most significant, in a statistical sense, in determining cooperation
rates in social dilemmas. One of these is the requests the
experimenter makes of the subjects. As a general rule, subjects in
social dilemmas cooperate substantially more when the experi-
menter asks them to cooperate and defect substantially more when
the experimenter tells them to defect.29 This effect is so pronounced
that cooperation rates change dramaticallyifthe experimenter even
hints at what she wants the subjects to do. 0 For example, when
experimenters in one study presented subjects with a social
dilemma labeled the "Community Game," they observed cooperation
rates averaging sixty percent. Changing the name of the dilemma
to the "Wall Street Game" caused cooperation rates to drop dra-
matically, to an average of thirty percent.31
The finding that people tend to do what an authority figure
suggests they should do is unlikely to surprise any serious observer
of human nature.32 Nevertheless, from a rational choice perspective
it presents something of a puzzle. Purely selfish subjects in a social
dilemma should be indifferent to an experimenter's requests and
desires; after all, these do not affect their own monetary payoffs.
A second social factor that has proven important in determining
cooperation rates in social dilemmas is whether the players share
a sense of social identity (that is, a sense of membership in a
common group). For example, studies have found that allowing the
players in the game to communicate with each other significantly
increases the incidence of cooperative behavior, even when the
29. Id. at78 (finding that experimenters'explicit instructions to cooperate raised average
cooperation rates in large samples of social dilemma studies by as much as forty percentage
points, whereas formal instructions to defect lowered cooperation rate by as much as thirty-
three percentage points).
30. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naive Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 103, 106-07 (Edward S. Reed
et al. eds., 1996).
31. Id.
32. One ofthe most notorious and disturbing illustrations ofthis phenomenon is Stanley
Milgram's famous experiment in which subjects complied with his instructions to administer
a series of simulated "electric shocks" of supposedly increasing severity to a person on the
other side of a partition as a means of"training." Stanley Milgram, A Behavioral Study of
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL 371 (1973). Of course, such results are only
disturbing if one has other-regarding preferences.
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players are not allowed to discuss the game itself.3 3 More blatant
manipulations of group identity-for example, dividing players into
subgroups based on the color chip they pick out of a hat, or their
taste for abstract versus impressionist painting-also influence
the incidence of cooperative behavior. 4 Subjects asked to play
with members of another subgroup (an "out-group") cooperate
significantly less than they would in a game with members of their
own subgroup (their "in-group") or even with strangers. 5
Yet a third social variable that has proven important in deter-
mining cooperation in social dilemmas is what the subjects expect
their fellow subjects to do. If a player believes her fellows are likely
to cooperate, she is more likely to cooperate herself.3 6 This result
offers an especially strong challenge to the homo economicus model,
because the expectation that one's fellows will cooperate in a social
dilemma actually increases the expected return from defecting.
Nevertheless, if one thinks other players are going to behave
"nicely," as a statistical matter one is far more likely to behave
"nicely" oneself.
SOME ECONoMIc DETERMINANTS OF ALTRUISM IN SocIAL
DILEMMAS
In emphasizing the importance of social context in determining
the incidence of cooperation in social dilemmas, I do not wish to
leave the impression that economic factors are irrelevant or
insignificant. They are significant. It turns out, however, that they
33. Sally, supra note 23, at 78. See generally Robyn M. Dawes, SocialDilemmas, 31 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 169,185 (1980) (commenting that"[t]he salutary effects of communication on
cooperation are ubiquitous" and citing studies).
34. Sally, supra note 23, at 79.
35. Id. at 78-79 (indicating "subgroup identity decreased the probability of cooperation
by 12%-15%).
36. Scott T. Allison & Norbert L. Kerr, Group Correspondence Biases and the Provision
ofPublic Goods, 66 J. PERSONALITY& SOc. PSYCHOL. 688 (1994) (reporting that "[niumerous
studies have reported that individuals are more likely to cooperate when they expect other
group members to cooperate than when they expect others to defect" and citing authorities);
Dawes, supra note 33, at 187 (discussing same findings); Yamagishi, supra note 23, at 64-65
(discussing experimental findings that "expectations about other members' behavior is one
of the most important individual factors affecting members' decisions in social dilemmas).
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are significant in different ways than rational choice theory would
predict.
As already noted, any degree of cooperation in a social dilemma
game is inconsistent with the homo economicus model. Social
dilemma experiments thus offer compelling evidence that most
people behave in a far more other-regarding fashion than rational
choice theory predicts. But it appears that, even when people choose
to behave altruistically, they remain concerned about their own
welfare. Other things being equal, the incidence of cooperation in
social dilemmas drops significantly as the personal returns from
adopting a defecting strategy increase.37 The implication is that
most people are indeed capable of honor, fairness, and
generosity-as long as it does not cost them too much.
This possibility may help explain why the phenomenon of
altruistic behavior in everyday life has received so little attention
from rational choice theorists. It may be easy to overlook many
altruistic acts because they involve only small sacrifices on the part
of the altruists who indulge in them.38 At the same time, it is
important to recognize that the likelihood that altruistic behavior
occurs most often when it is least personally costly does not imply
37. For example, David Sally's survey of nearly one hundred studies reported that
doubling the reward from defecting appeared to decrease average cooperation rates by as
much as sixteen percent Sally, supra note 23, at 75.
38. It may also explain why most people seem to try to stay within the constraints oftort
law and criminal law, even when a cold calculation of costs and benefits suggests they could
profit fromnegligent or criminal behavior. In theory, legal sanctions alone can deter criminal
and tortious conduct-if the sanction is severe enough and the law is enforced often enough.
In practice, there are many situations in modem life where a purely selfish person might
calculate-after discounting the likely sanction by the probability that her misbehavior
might never be detected or punished-that she could profit from a crime or tort. Rational
choice theory predicts that homo economicus would run amok in the face of such
underenforcement. The social dilemma evidence suggests, however, that "optimal
deterrance"--reducing the expected benefit from a crime or tort to zero-is unnecessary to
motivate a properly-socialized homo sapiens to avoid harming others. All that is needed is
to frame the social context so that torts and crimes are viewed as unacceptable behaviors,
and then to impose sufficient expected sanctions to reduce the opportunity cost associated
with obeying the law to the point where most people are willing to make the sacrifice
associated with such other-regarding behavior.
This analysis predicts that when the law is underenforced, we should expect the
population of people who commit torts and crimes to include a disproportionate number of
those who are not inclined toward altruism, and those whose cultural backgrounds have led
them to perceive torts and crimes as socially acceptable behaviors.
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that altruism is an unimportant phenomenon. Small acts of
altruism, when added up over many individuals and many
interactions, can produce great aggregate social gains. Moreover, as
the parable of the Good Samaritan illustrates, an altruistic act that
costs the benefactor relatively little may result in a much greater
good for the beneficiary. 9
Interestingly, there is reason to believe that it is in just such
circumstances that people are most likely to behave altruistically.
In addition to personal cost, a second economic variable that
appears to influence the incidence of altruism in social dilemmas is
the magnitude of the benefits of one's cooperation to one's fellow
players.4" Other things being equal, subjects in a social dilemma
cooperate more as the payoff to their fellows from their cooperation
41rises.
Cooperation rates in social dilemmas accordingly appear to be
negatively correlated with the cost of cooperation to the cooperating
player, and positively correlated with the benefits of cooperation to
others. Taken together, these two empirical findings suggest that
when social context favors other-regarding behavior, people behave
like intuitive utilitarians. In considering what course of action to
choose, they weigh aggregate benefits and costs, including not only
benefits and harms to others but also benefits and harms to
themselves. Altruism is most likely when the cost to oneself of
behaving altruistically is relatively small and the benefit to others
relatively large.
39. In the parable ofthe Good Samaritan, a traveler attacked by robbers and left for dead
was found in the road by the Samaritan, who bandaged him, carried him to an inn, and paid
the innkeeper two silver pieces to look after him. Luke 10:29-36 (New English). Although two
pieces of silver may have been a substantial cost to the Samaritan, it was surely smaller than
the benefit to the traveler.
40. In a sense, this is a "social" economic variable, as a purely selfish actor would be
indifferent to the magnitude of the benefits she brings to others.
41. Sally, supra note 23, at 79 (stating that "the size of the loss to the group if strictly
self-interested choices are made instead of altruistic ones ... is important and positive" in
predicting cooperation). This suggests that players are willing to incur a rather large
personal sacrifice if this produces greater good for the others in the game.
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HOMO SAPIENS DOES NOT (ALWAYS) BEHAVE LIKE HOMO
ECONOMICUS
Legal scholars willing to venture beyond rational choice theory
into the broader social sciences will find an extensive literature on
human altruism. In reviewing some of the evidence that has been
compiled on human behavior in social dilemmas, I have touched
upon only a fragment of that literature. Yet even this brief tour
suggests a model of human nature that differs radically from the
homo economicus model of rational choice.
Social dilemma studies indicate that most people have at least
two personalities, or as an economist might put it, two revealed
preference functions. In some social situations-for example,
buying a car-people predictably behave as if they care only about
their own payoffs. In other social situations-for example, at a
wedding reception-they predictably behave as if they care at least
to some extent about costs and benefits to others. Put differently,
preferences are not fixed and exogenous as rational choice
presumes, but shift in response to changes in social context. When
a respected authority says "you may be selfish," when we don't
share a common social identity, when others in similar circum-
stances appear to be acting selfishly-we behave selfishly. When
authority says "look out for others," when we share a sense of
common social identity, when we believe others are behaving
altruistically-we behave altruistically.
This doubled-sided portrait of human nature offers to shed much-
needed light on the question of how we can best motivate judges to
serve as faithful hierarchs. If the judiciary is indeed an institution
built on the expectation and experience ofjudicial altruism, even in
its diluted form of commitment to public service, understanding the
determinants of altruistic behavior may well be the key to
encouraging good judging. Of course, any model ofjudicial behavior
that incorporates the phenomenon of socially contingent altruism
will be more complicated than the elegant homo economicus model
of rational choice. There seems no reason to assume, however, that
a more-nuanced framework would be so complicated as to exceed
our capacity to understand and apply it. Moreover, the potential
rewards justify the extra effort. Whatever else they teach us, social
dilemma studies unambiguously demonstrate that the homo
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economicus model is seriously incomplete. To understand and
predict human behavior, it is often essential to take account of the
empirical reality of socially contingent altruism.
Thus I would like to offer some speculations on what the social
dilemma evidence implies for hierarch behavior in general, and for
judicial behavior in particular. I emphasize that my remarks should
not be interpreted as a call for any particular policy reform. One of
the foremost lessons of the social dilemma evidence is that it is
dangerous to base policy on a priori analysis. Altruistic behavior is
contingent on social context, and social context is a complex
phenomenon. How one speaks, how one dresses, the customs and
rituals one follows, the size of one's office or salary-each of these
things sends a variety of sometimes conflicting signals to be picked
up by the social antennae of those around us. As a result, attempts
to change social context can easily lead to unintended and
undesired consequences, and any particular proposal for reforming
the judiciary should be "field tested" for success before being
implemented more broadly.
Let me also confess immediately that my arguments are based on
extrapolation, and subject to all the associated dangers. There is
reason to suspect extrapolation may be appropriate; for example,
although many of the published social dilemma studies have relied
on undergraduate and graduate students as subjects, similar
results have been observed in experiments run among nonstudents
in other cultures, including cultures that differ dramatically from
our own.42 Similarly, there is much other evidence in the broader
social sciences literature on altruism that is consistent with the
social dilemma findings."3 It is important to bear in mind, however,
that social dilemma experiments by their very nature take place in
a simplified and artificial environment that cannot begin to mimic
the complexities of the real world. As a result, we cannot be sure
42. See, e.g., JosephHenrich etal., Cooperation, Reciprocity, andPunishments in Fifteen
Small-Scale Societies, 91 AM. ECON. REV. (2001) (finding that subjects drawn from seven
hunter-gatherer, nomadic, and other small-scale societies all displayed significantly positive
cooperation rates in playing single-shot social dilemma games with strangers, ranging from
an average twenty-two percent cooperation rate among the Machiguenga to a fifty-eight
percent cooperation rate among the Orma, and concluding that "the canonical model [of self-
interested behavior] is not supported in any society studied").
43. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (1990) (detailing how
individuals in developing societies deal with "public goods" problems).
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that behavior inside the experimental laboratory necessarily
predicts behavior outside it.
Yet if we are willing to assume that people in daily life behave in
a way that bears any significant resemblance to how they behave in
experimental games, social dilemma experiments offer to open new
paths of discovery for those who seek a better understanding of the
judiciary and of judicial behavior. To illustrate, I offer some
conjectures on how taking account of altruism might allow us to
increase the chances that judges will choose to decide cases
carefully, impartially, and well. These are only preliminary
thoughts, meant to suggest directions for future research more than
to provide ultimate conclusions. Nevertheless, they hint at some of
the rewards to be reaped from recognizing that judges, like the rest
of us, are capable not only of selfishness and avarice, but also
altruism and integrity.
RECOGNIZING THE REALITY OF SOCIALLY CONTINGENT ALTRUISM:
SOME POSSIBLE LESSONS FOR JUDGES AND JUDGING
I would like to begin by considering some of the more obvious
lessons we might draw from the social dilemma evidence on
altruism. These lessons are the ones drawn from the empirical
finding that altruistic behavior tends to decline as the personal cost
of altruism increases.
First, if we want judges to decide cases impartially-that is, in a
fashion determined by the law (wherever one finds it) rather than
by the identities of the litigating parties-it may be essential to
ensure that judges do not have personal stakes in the outcomes of
the cases they decide. For example, judges should not be allowed to
decide disputes in which they have a direct interest, nor should
they be allowed to accept bribes or other payments from the parties.
Similarly, if we want judges to decide cases carefully, we must
reduce the cost of exercising care. One way to accomplish this is to
adopt rules against judicial "moonlighting," thus reducing the
opportunity cost of a judge's deciding to put her time and effort into
judging rather than some more lucrative enterprise." It also
44. See Posner, supra note 10, at 33-34 (discussing moonlighting).
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probably is a good idea to select as judges individuals who are
already familiar with the law, for example, seasoned practitioners
and legal scholars. If you were to hand a layperson a black robe and
put him behind the bench, his personal cost of learning the
appropriate rules of law would likely be quite high, and the
likelihood of his altruistically expending enough effort to do a good
job correspondingly low.
Many readers may find such suggestions annoyingly obvious.
Indeed, on first inspection they appear to be the same sorts of
suggestions one might take from the familiar homo economicus
model.45 It is important to recognize, however, that under the homo
economicus model, rules that stop judges from moonlighting,
accepting bribes, or deciding cases in which they have a personal
stake are necessary but not sufficient to create incentives for good
judging. Put differently, they reduce incentives for judges to decide
cases badly (that is, carelessly, erroneously, or in a biased fashion).
They do not, however, create incentives for judges to decide cases
well.
Social dilemma experiments suggest that, under the right
circumstances, altruism can provide such an incentive. Imposing
constraints on the pursuit of self-interest not only discourages
judges from doing what we do not want them to do; it also frees
them to do what we want them to do-decide cases in a fair and
careful manner. This will only occur, however, when the social and
economic circumstances favor altruism. Thus, it is important to
take account of some of the other implications of the evidence on
behavior in social dilemmas.
Let us start with the empirical finding that people in social
dilemmas cooperate more as the perceived benefits of their
cooperation to others increase. This finding suggests that if we want
judges to do a good job, we need to encourage them to believe that
the decisions they reach are, in fact, important to other people.
There are of course a variety of different ways to signal to judges
that their jobs are important to others. One of the most obvious
45. They are also the same sorts of suggestions one might take from experience. Most of
us are skilled if not always conscious observers of human behavior, and so are familiar, at
least at an intuitive level, with many of its determinants. Many of the results from social
dilemma studies accordingly confirm what we already know from "common sense."
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signals-some might even say crude-is the salary we pay them. In
contemporary American culture, a high salary is often viewed as
evidence of merit and value. Thus it is perhaps a matter for concern
when federal judges receive lower salaries than their law clerks
expect to earn after leaving their clerkships and beginning work as
associates in law firms. From a public policy perspective, this may
be penny-wise and pound-foolish, if it signals to judges that their
altruistic efforts at careful lawmaking are unimportant and
undervalued.46
Similarly, what can we learn from the observation that people in
social dilemmas cooperate more when they believe other people
are also cooperating? One possible implication is that, if we want
judges to do a good job and to decide cases carefully, fairly, and
impartially, it is essential that they believe that other judges in
other courts also are deciding cases carefully, fairly, and im-
partially. This observation hints at the tremendous damage that
can be done by highly publicized opinions like Bush v. Gore." In
reaching their decisions in that case, the justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court were widely perceived to have behaved in a biased
and partisan fashion.4" Such perceptions clearly undermine public
faith in the Supreme Court's ability to act as a neutral arbiter. But
they also damage the functioning of the judiciary as a whole, if they
suggest to other judges in other courts that they need not behave
impartially because Supreme Court justices do not.49
What about the variable of a common social identity? The social
dilemma evidence suggests that judges are likely to do a better job
46. It should be noted that a contrary argument can be made that low judicial salaries
may actually encourage greater altruism if people differ in their inclinations towards
altruism, and ifa low salary serves a"filtering" function by discouraging individuals who are
relatively inclined toward selfishness from seeking or accepting judicial appointments.
47. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
48. See SEIDMAN, supra note 18 (noting that polls indicate that a large portion of the
public think that the Supreme Court's decision was politically partisan); see also VINCENT
BUGLIOSI, THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICA: How THE SUPREME COURT UNDERMINED THE
CONSTITUTIONAND CHOSE OURPRESMENT (2001) (critiquing opinion); ALANM. DERSHOWITz,
SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED THE ELECTION (2001) (same).
49. WellbeforeBushv. Gore, Judge HarryEdwards expressed a similarfear that apublic
perception ofjudges as politically motivated decision makers could "become a self-fulfilling
prophecy." Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, supra note 14, at 838.
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of judging when they share a common sense of social identity with
the litigants who appear before them. I am not, of course,
suggesting that we want to encourage judges to feel a sense of
common social identity with, say, mass murderers. Rather, my
point is that judges should not feel too socially distant from the
general citizenry whose interests they are supposed to represent.
Considering this, I am troubled by the custom of dressing judges in
formal black robes, seating them behind an imposing bench, and (in
many courtrooms) raising the bench above floor level so that they
peer down over it at the people whose cases are they are being
asked to decide. On the one hand, such customs may serve a
valuable function if they act as an ongoing reminder to the judge of
the gravity and importance of her role. (At the very least, a black
robe is a cheaper way of signaling someone's importance than
paying them a larger salary.) On the other hand, such customs
increase the social distance between judges and the litigants whose
fortunes they decide. The result may be a decline in judges'
motivation to behave altruistically by expending the effort and
attention required to decide cases well and carefully.
Finally, I would like to consider some of the implications of the
finding that people are more likely to behave altruistically when a
respected authority figure (in social dilemma experiments, the
experimenter) suggests that they should. 0 This finding suggests
that if we want good judging, it would be extremely valuable if we
could find someone in a position of authority to tell judges that they
ought to do a good job of judging. The obvious problem is: who or
what is in a position of authority relative to judges? A federal
district judge's authority is technically subordinate to that of the
relevant Circuit Court, and the Circuit Court subordinate to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Yet the federal judiciary as a whole is an
independent branch of government, free from the command or
control of either the legislative or executive branch.
Whom or what, then, do judges view as authority? Let me offer
one potential answer. You may laugh or you may weep, but it is
possible that one authority whose views judges may care about is
the legal academy-that is, the law professors who express opinions
50. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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about the quality of judges' judging in scholarly works and in
comments reported by the media.
If judges pay attention to what academics say, the following
disturbing possibility arises. As I have already noted, over the past
twenty years it has become commonplace for the scholarly
literature to view the judiciary through the lens of rational choice
theory, and so to presume that judicial behavior is driven primarily
(indeed, solely) by such selfish motives as the desire to enhance
one's reputation, the desire to be promoted to a higher court, or the
desire to maximize one's power.5 ' When scholars and commentators
talk about judges as if they are solely self-interested, that sends a
signal to judges that self-interested behavior is both common and
expected on the bench. That signal, in turn, increases the likelihood
that judges in fact will choose to decide cases in a self-interested
fashion. A self-fulfilling prophecy results.
This may explain why, as Frederick Schauer has observed, "to
raise the topic of judicial self-interest in the company of judges is
something like raising the topic of steak tartare at a convention of
vegetarians." 2 Judges understand, at an intuitive level, that the
judicial role is premised on society's expectation that judges, when
they are judging, will adopt an other-regarding preference function
rather than a self-interested preference function; that they will seek
not to improve their own welfare but to "do the right thing." Judges
also understand at an intuitive level that to talk about judges as if
they allow self-interest to influence their decisions (even if on
occasion it does) increases the likelihood that they will in fact
behave selfishly.
Public choice theory, with its emphasis on the homo economicus
model, may provide yet another variation on Heisenberg's
Uncertainty Principle. In making observations about judicial
behavior, legal scholars may change it. I admit I do not lose much
sleep over this possibility. My own suspicion is that academic
theorizing has remarkably little effect on what nonacademics,
including judges, do.' Yet there is a second risk scholars run if they
51. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
52. Schauer, supra note 11, at 623.
53. This is not to say that nonacademics do not occasionally cite scholarly work in
support of positions they have already decided to take.
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insist on always analyzing judicial behavior through the lens of
rational choice. That risk, quite simply, is that we will fail to
understand the nature of the judicial role, and fail as well to
understand judicial behavior.
CONCLUSION
It has become commonplace in recent years for legal scholars to
apply the tools of rational choice to the institution of the judiciary,
and to analyze judicial behavior primarily in terms of the homo
economicus model of rational self-interest. I have come to believe
that this approach is misleading. As an empirical matter, homo
sapiens clearly is capable of-indeed, inclined toward-altruistic
consideration of others' costs and benefits under a variety of
circumstances. In other words, people are not always selfish. This
phenomenon is important to our understanding of human behavior
in a wide variety of contexts, and it may be of special importance in
addressing questions of judicial motivation.
The modern judiciary is an institution that is premised in large
part upon the expectation and the historical experience of judicial
altruism, in the form of judges' willingness to devote significant
time and effort to deciding legal disputes carefully, impartially, and
in accordance with the law. In other words, the judiciary exists
because we believe that judges can behave, to at least some extent,
in an other-regarding fashion. An important corollary is that the
smaller the role altruism seems to play in determining judicial
behavior, the less acceptance and social legitimacy the judiciary is
likely to enjoy.
That possibility highlights the importance of taking account of
the empirical reality of other-regarding behavior and the various
social and economic variables that can promote it. In making
this observation, I do not mean to suggest that self-interest is
unimportant to understanding judicial behavior. To the contrary,
the empirical evidence indicates that in deciding whether to act
altruistically, most people keep close track of their own personal
costs and benefits.' Thus one of the first steps we must take to
54. See supra note 37.
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encourage judges to decide cases in an other-regarding fashion is to
reduce, to the greatest extent possible, any chance that they might
personally gain or lose as a result of how they decide their cases.
Addressing the problem of judicial self-interest is only the first
step, however. If we want to accomplish more than simply deterring
judges from deciding cases self-interestedly-ifwe want to motivate
them to decide cases well-we must do more. In particular, we must
pay attention to the phenomenon of judicial altruism, and to the
economic and social variables that promote and discourage it.
In other words, in the quest to understand what judges
"maximize," it is a mistake to assume that self-interest is the only
variable worth focusing on. If we persist on treating judges and
other hierarchs as if they are purely selfish beings, we will miss
half the story, and arguably the most important half.
